



INNOVATIVE: Journal Of Social Science Research

Volume 4 Nomor 6 Tahun 2024 Page 2586-2596

E-ISSN 2807-4238 and P-ISSN 2807-4246

Website: <https://j-innovative.org/index.php/Innovative>

Effectiveness of the Corruption Crime Judge Selection Process in Preventing Corruption in Indonesian Judicial Institutions

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Abstrak

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengevaluasi efektivitas proses seleksi hakim Pengadilan Tindak Pidana Korupsi dalam mencegah perilaku korupsi di lembaga peradilan. Menggunakan metode penelitian hukum normatif, penelitian ini berfokus pada analisis peraturan perundang-undangan terkait, termasuk Undang-Undang No. 46 Tahun 2009 dan Peraturan Mahkamah Agung No. 2 Tahun 2019 tentang Tata Cara Seleksi Hakim Ad Hoc, untuk mengkaji apakah mekanisme seleksi telah memenuhi tujuannya dalam menjamin integritas hakim. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa meskipun seleksi dilakukan secara ketat, kelemahan dalam pengawasan pasca-seleksi dan tekanan eksternal menyebabkan hakim Tindak Pidana Korupsi tetap rentan terhadap perilaku korupsi. Faktor-faktor seperti lemahnya sistem pengawasan internal, kurangnya sanksi yang tegas, dan tekanan politik serta ekonomi memperburuk situasi ini. Reformasi yang menyeluruh, termasuk penguatan pengawasan, peningkatan transparansi dalam penegakan sanksi, dan peningkatan kesejahteraan hakim, diperlukan untuk memastikan sistem seleksi dan pengawasan yang lebih efektif.

Kata Kunci: *Hakim Tindak Pidana Korupsi, Seleksi Hakim, Korupsi, Pengawasan Peradilan, Integritas Hakim.*

Abstract

The purpose of this research is to determine how well the criteria used to choose judges for the Corruption Court work to keep corrupt officials out of the courtroom. This study employs normative legal research methods to analyze relevant laws and regulations, such as Law No. 46 of 2009 and Supreme Court Regulation No. 2 of 2019, which deal with the selection of ad hoc judges. The goal is to determine if the selection process has been successful in ensuring that judges are honest. The research found that judges serving on the Corruption Court are susceptible to corrupt conduct due to external influences and gaps in post-selection monitoring, notwithstanding the rigorous screening process. This is made worse by factors including lax internal oversight mechanisms, a lack of stringent punishments, and economic and political pressures. To guarantee a more effective supervision and selection system, comprehensive changes are required, such as enhancing monitoring, making punishment enforcement more transparent, and improving judges' welfare.

Keywords: Corruption Criminal Judge, Judge Selection, Corruption, Judicial Supervision, Judge Integrity.

INTRODUCTION

Society and the state are greatly affected by corruption. In Indonesia, corruption is defined under Law No. 31 of 1999 on the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Corruption, as revised by Law No. 20 of 2001 (Muhtar, 2019). The law defines corruption as misuse of power, bribery, or embezzlement that undermines governmental finances or the economy to benefit people or organizations. Indonesia created the Corruption Court to combat this crime.

Law No. 46 of 2009 created the Corruption Court, a cornerstone of Indonesia's criminal judicial system. This court has justices appointed by the Judicial Commission and Corruption Eradication Commission after a rigorous procedure (Suwito et al., 2023). Corruption judges must be honest and competent to uphold justice.

Supreme Court Regulation No. 2 of 2019 governs the appointment of ad hoc judges in corruption crime courts. Written competence exams, profile evaluations, and in-depth interviews evaluate potential judges' ability, honesty, and dedication to fighting corruption. The selecting group includes credible supreme court judges, community leaders, and academics (Matogu & Rusmiati, 2023). To guarantee only qualified applicants qualify, the Corruption Eradication Commission and Judicial Commission provide comments.

Despite tight vetting standards, numerous Corruption Crime judges have been caught bribing and abusing their power. This raises serious issues about whether the selection process protects judges' integrity after they join office. The bribing of Corruption Crime judges is a symptom of Indonesia's legal system's ongoing struggle to eliminate corruption

in society and the judiciary.

Cases of judges being caught in alleged corruption cases have become a major focus in law enforcement in Indonesia, especially in the context of the Corruption Court. Based on documents revealed by the Indonesia Corruption Watch (ICW), cases of arrests of Corruption judges by the Corruption Eradication Commission have recorded significant numbers. For example, Judge Sudiwardono, Chief Justice of the Manado High Court, was arrested in 2017 for accepting a bribe from a member of the House of Representatives to influence a verdict related to a corruption case in Bolaang Mongondow Regency. In addition, Judge Dewi Suryana from the Bengkulu Corruption Court was also arrested in the same year after accepting a bribe of Rp125 million to arrange the verdict of another corruption case (Putra et al., 2023).

This reveals that although Corruption Crime judges are essential in fighting corruption, some of them are subject to bribery. This shows that the Supreme Court's internal supervision, even with restrictions like Supreme Court Regulation No. 8 of 2016 on Supervision and Guidance of Direct Superiors, cannot dissuade corrupt justices. The Supreme Court Supervisory Body and Judicial Commission's poor judge monitoring raises the risk of judicial integrity infractions.

The lack of a thorough screening procedure to avoid corruption among Corruption Crime judges reveals basic inadequacies in oversight and integrity enforcement. Although potential judges are selected via many procedures to test their competency and morals, some are nonetheless found to be corrupt after taking office. This casts doubt on long-term monitoring and the necessity for law enforcement integrity control.

The poor internal supervision system once the judge is selected is a major issue. Consistent Supreme Court Regulation No. 8 of 2016 monitoring and direct superior supervision are rare. Supervision organizations like the Supreme Court Supervisory Body and the Judicial Commission are also inadequate in preventing or discovering ethics and integrity infractions (Safira, 2019).

The stress from external and internal parties in the workplace may also impact judges' independence. Judges are more susceptible to bribery and other lawbreaking due to political and financial pressure. The absence of strong punishments weakens the deterrent impact for violators, hence judicial corruption persists.

Based on explanation, why does the tight screening procedure for Corruption Crime judges not prevent court corruption? (2) Why do Corruption Crime judges remain prone to corruption despite a rigorous vetting process?

RESEARCH METHOD

This study adopts a normative legal approach to examine literature and legal documents (Ishaq, 2017). This study will examine Supreme Court Regulation No. 2 of 2019 on Procedures for the Selection of Ad Hoc Judges in Corruption Courts to answer the first problem formulation, which is why the strict selection process for Corruption Court judges is still ineffective in preventing court corruption. Normative descriptive analysis will examine how these selection requirements are applied in the field and if post-selection monitoring is acceptable. The study will use primary legal sources like Corruption Court legislation and secondary legal resources like Corruption Eradication Commission case studies of judge arrests.

This research will employ a juridical-analytical technique to solve the second issue formulation, which is why Corruption Crime judges are prone to corruption despite a rigorous vetting procedure. The investigation will concentrate on structural reasons and deficiencies in judges' internal and external supervision systems after they assume office. To understand why judges still engage in corrupt acts, Judicial Commission and Corruption Eradication Commission reports and scholarly literature on judicial supervision will be studied. This study will also examine how external pressure, inadequate integrity enforcement, and weak punishments contribute to this phenomena.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

1. Ineffectiveness of the Corruption Crime Judge Selection Process in Preventing Corruption

Indonesian laws and regulations govern the Corruption Court's judge selection process to ensure honesty and competency. Several fundamental rules, notably Law No. 46 of 2009 on the Corruption Court, create the essential foundation for its creation and judge nomination (Tampubolon, 2014). This court has career and ad hoc judges. Ad hoc judges are required to handle corruption cases involving powerful political and economic players with neutrality, therefore their selection procedure is tighter and emphasizes honesty.

The Supreme Court Regulation No. 2 of 2019 on Ad Hoc Judge Selection at the Corruption Court likewise governs this process. Written competence exams, psychological profile evaluations, and in-depth interviews are used to choose candidates, according to this legislation (Rianda, 2020). The competency test evaluates the prospective judge's knowledge of the legal system, especially corruption, while the psychological profile assessment evaluates their personality and emotional handling of pressure, according to Article 5 of the Supreme Court Regulation. Article 7 underlines that the interview will concentrate on the prospective judge's honesty, morality, and law enforcement dedication.

Supervisory authorities like the Judicial Commission and Corruption Eradication Commission also weigh heavily on judge selection. The Judicial Commission may oversee judges' conduct and suggest candidates for appointment under Article 13 of Law No. 18 of 2011. The Corruption Eradication Commission regularly advises on potential judges' honesty (Sari, 2022).

All of these rules aim to choose corruption judges with high ethical standards and judicial independence. Even if this selection has tight protocols, there are still several flaws that enable Corruption Crime judges to bribe and violate ethics, calling into doubt the efficiency of the current selection method.

The Indonesian procedure for selecting Corruption Crime judges is unsuccessful at preventing judicial corruption (Tiranda et al., 2019). Despite severe selection criteria like Law No. 46 of 2009 and Supreme Court Regulation No. 2 of 2019, corruption is still common among Corruption Crime judges. According to written competence exams, psychological profile evaluations, and in-depth interviews, the selection procedure is not adequate to assure that judges are free from corruption. Corruption Eradication Commission cases show widespread selection oversight and implementation flaws.

In 2017, the Corruption Eradication Commission arrested Sudiwardono, the Chief Justice of the Manado High Court, for accepting bribes from People's Representative Council member Aditya Anugerah Moha. This shows that strict selection is not enough to prevent corruption. Despite a rigorous vetting procedure, Sudiwardono engaged in bribes that violated justice. The Supreme Court Supervisory Body and Judicial Commission should have performed post-selection monitoring, however this instance revealed inadequacies.

Lack of deterrence from punishments for corrupt judges is another issue. Despite the Corruption Eradication Commission's many sting operations (OTT) against judges involved in bribery, such as the case of Bengkulu Corruption Crime judge Dewi Suryana, who was arrested in the same year, this phenomenon persists. Dewi Suryana was arrested for receiving a Rp125 million bribe to settle a corruption case. This indicates that corruption persists despite legal penalties due to a lack of enforcement and monitoring.

Poor working conditions that undermine judges' integrity intensify the problem. Corruption Crime judges may bribe because political and economic interests in the cases being tried push them. This pressure sometimes comes from powerful authorities or politicians who can affect justice. This suggests that the selection process, insufficient oversight, and severe external pressure are all to blame (Hendrawati & Krisnan, 2020).

Therefore, although the present laws contain procedures to preserve the integrity of Corruption Crime judges, the tight selection process has not prevented judicial corruption

instances. This failure highlights a deficit in post-selection monitoring and the need for change to address Corruption Crime judges' integrity difficulties.

A comprehensive and substantial solution that encompasses multiple basic selection and supervision system improvements is required to address the CCR judge selection process's ineffectiveness lack combating corruption. Here are some ideas:

1. Enhanced Post-Selection Supervision : Despite a thorough vetting procedure, the control system must be strengthened when judges are appointed. Implementing a periodic performance and integrity assessment system for judges with stronger and more consistent criteria may achieve this. The Supreme Court Supervisory Body (BAWAS) and Judicial Commission should supervise judges' conduct and rulings more. An unbiased and transparent audit team working with the Corruption Eradication Commission may evaluate courts. After judges become powerful without proper monitoring, interrupted or less thorough surveillance may lead to corruption. This periodic oversight should include administrative, integrity, and ethical audits.
2. Enhancing Sanctions Enforcement Transparency : To prevent corrupt judges, sanctions must be tightened and enforced. Strong and persistent penalties are needed to complement effective monitoring. The Corruption Eradication Commission and Judicial Commission must work together to guarantee that judges who break the law are punished legally and administratively. Additionally, the findings of judge corruption cases must be made open so the public may know how much solid action has been done to avoid court corruption. Transparency will strengthen public accountability of the judiciary and warn other judges not to engage in corrupt acts.
3. Enhanced Judicial Independence Protection from External Pressure Influence from interested parties, particularly those with political or economic power, renders Corruption Crime judges susceptible to bribery and corruption. To solve this, supervisory agencies like the Judicial Commission and BAWAS must help judges preserve their independence. A stronger policy to shield judges from outside interference is needed. Judges might be protected from physical and financial intimidation by tightening laws. Strong protection will enable judges perform their jobs honestly and without outside interference.
4. Selection System Reform: Prioritize Integrity Assessment : Although competence examinations and interviews are important for Corruption Crime judges, integrity evaluation should be more important. One option is to thoroughly evaluate potential judges' professional and personal backgrounds. Integrity is verified by psychological profile evaluations and by reviewing individuals' professional track records, including

their involvement with integrity and ethical matters. Additionally, a more thorough background check is needed to identify applicants with corrupt pasts.

5. Enhancing Inter-Agency Coordination and Reassessing Court Supervision Regulations : Supreme Court Regulation No. 8 of 2016 on Supervision and Guidance of Direct Superiors must be carefully assessed to see whether it effectively supervises judges. To identify judicial corruption loopholes, the Corruption Eradication Commission and Judicial Commission must be involved in this examination. To improve oversight of possible infractions, the Supreme Court, Judicial Commission, and Corruption Eradication Commission must work together. Integrity and corruption prevention courses must be included to the coaching judge curriculum constantly.

Therefore, the measures to tighten continuing oversight, increase openness in punishment enforcement, and change the selection method to emphasize integrity must be adopted quickly. All relevant institutions must agree to consistent and comprehensive policy for all these processes. These actions are crucial to preventing judge corruption and rebuilding public faith in the judiciary, notably the Corruption Court, which fights corruption in Indonesia.

Comprehensive and coordinated changes are intended to improve the Corruption Crime justice system and allow elected judges to act with integrity and without external corruption. This is crucial to ensuring that the Indonesian court remains the final stronghold of law enforcement and corruption eradication.

2. Vulnerability Factors of Judges to Corruption Crimes against Corrupt Behavior

Despite a rigorous vetting procedure, Corruption Court justices are nonetheless vulnerable to corruption. This selection procedure involves competence tests, psychological examinations, and interviews to determine judges' honesty, morality, and legal ability. Field studies reveal that Corruption Court judges are still susceptible to corruption. What causes these judges to continue dishonest conduct despite a screening procedure supposed to ensure their moral and professional integrity?

External pressure at work contributes to this sensitivity. Corruption judges typically hear cases involving powerful political and business figures. Parties in corruption cases might influence the judicial process by political, financial, or intimidation (Wicaksono, 2018). Pressure allows for decision-making aberrations. Despite meticulous vetting, pecuniary temptations and outside pressures remain danger concerns for these judges.

The poor post-selection supervisory structure makes Corruption Crime judges vulnerable in addition to external pressure. Despite Supreme Court Regulation No. 8 of 2016

on Supervision and Guidance of Direct Superiors, Indonesian judicial supervision is ineffective. The Supreme Court Supervisory Body (BAWAS) and Judicial Commission have failed to uncover and prevent corruption once justices are inaugurated (Nuzha, 2024). If the court leadership is corrupt, the internal supervision structure that should prevent corruption typically fails.

The absence of harsh consequences for corrupt judges increases this susceptibility. The Corruption Eradication Commission has punished numerous corrupt judges, but the fines are not always enough to dissuade them. The mild and uneven punishments suggest Corruption Crime judges' ethical and legal transgressions are not a major issue. Thus, corrupt behaviors create a norm, damaging the court and public faith in Indonesia's anti-corruption efforts.

Even though Corruption Crime judges are selected rigorously, systemic inadequacies in Indonesia's legal and supervisory framework make them vulnerable to corruption. This is exacerbated by the poor oversight and guiding structure for judges once they reach office. Supreme Court Regulation No. 8 of 2016 on Supervision and Guidance of Direct Superiors has been poorly implemented. Internal monitoring, usually assigned to the court chief, is ineffectual when the chief is corrupt or unethical. Because superior monitoring fails, this establishes a cycle of corruption that is hard to escape.

The whistleblower and witness protection mechanism, which may reveal judicial wrongdoing, has flaws. The protection mechanism for reporting justice system corruption is still weak, prompting court staff and parties who know about breaches to dread reporting (Pertiwi & Rahmad, 2020). The legal system's incapacity to protect whistleblowers from reprisal or intimidation reduces judicial corruption exposure. Corruption Crime judges' corrupt acts go undiscovered and repeat without a secure reporting method.

Furthermore, the complexity of corruption cases tried by Corruption Court judges often involves extensive corruption networks, spanning multiple levels of bureaucracy and actors with significant power. In such situations, judges face extraordinary difficulties in maintaining their independence. The judicial environment is often under-resourced to handle pressure from powerful actors involved in the case. The lack of institutional support, whether in the form of training or security facilities, makes judges vulnerable to compromise for their personal safety or comfort, thus triggering bribery and gratification practices.

In addition to structural factors and weaknesses in oversight, the culture of corruption that has taken root in some institutions also plays a significant role. In some cases, newly appointed judges may find themselves in a system that is already infected by corruption, where informal norms that support bribery have already been established. (Widodo et al.,

2019). In such an environment, new judges who initially have integrity may face pressure to conform to the culture or risk being alienated by their colleagues. Corruption becomes part of the “way” of the business that is difficult to combat individually without strong institutional support.

Finally, judge pay issues might increase corruption risk. Despite recent increases in Indonesian court salary, the risk-reward ratio is sometimes lopsided. Corruption Court judges confront high-profile cases with the potential for enormous pecuniary benefit for anyone attempting to influence court judgments. Low economic incentives and unjust compensation schemes in the judicial bureaucracy might drive judges to pursue financial gain illegally.

Deep structural change is needed to safeguard Corruption Crime judges against corruption, including initial selection, long-term monitoring, judicial independence, and equitable incentives. Strengthening post-selection monitoring is crucial. Judges must be closely monitored after taking office to ensure their integrity. This oversight requires cooperation between the Supreme Court, Judicial Commission, and Corruption Eradication Commission. For performance and integrity reviews, including audits of judges' wealth and possible conflicts of interest, a separate independent supervision team may work. This internal supervision must use contemporary monitoring technologies to identify suspect financial transactions or inappropriate judge-party interactions.

Sharper and more forceful protection mechanisms are needed to safeguard judges' independence from outside pressures. Powerful political and economic parties push Corruption Crime judges. A legislative structure that protects judges from undue pressure is needed, particularly in significant cases involving political or commercial interests. Prioritize amenities that enable independence, such as physical and financial security for judges and their families. This protects judges from intimidation and lets them work more focused without threats.

As incentives, judges' pay should be greatly enhanced to reflect their risks and obligations. Although judges' incomes in Indonesia have increased, the risks and benefits of Corruption Court judges are frequently disproportionate. In Corruption Courts, where judges hear serious corruption cases, a hefty payment might be tempting if there is no financial motive to decline. Therefore, judicial welfare changes should include wage increases and bonuses or special incentives for judges with high integrity and good performance.

In addition to incentives and protection, the court system needs cultural transformation. Integrity education must be ongoing to combat the corruption culture in numerous judicial

institutions. The selection process should begin with this information, and all judges should get ongoing training. Ethics, integrity, and professional responsibility training should be required at all judicial levels. Every judge should be re-evaluated periodically to ensure they follow the law and professional ethics.

Finally, improvements should improve transparency and accountability. Transparent judicial processes, including release of supervision and judge assessment findings, may improve accountability. Transparent systems enable the public to supervise judges via the media and civic society and observe their honesty firsthand. Thus, this reform should make the judicial system cleaner, more efficient, and more trustworthy in eliminating corruption.

CONCLUSION

The Corruption Court's rigorous selection procedure for judges, which emphasizes honesty and expertise, has failed to prevent judicial corruption. Corruption Court judges are prone to corruption due to insufficient post-selection oversight, lax punishments, and external political and economic pressure. This shows that the court system needs better supervision and selection system reform, including judge welfare and openness and accountability. These actions are crucial to restoring the Corruption Court's legitimacy and ensuring that the chosen judges can perform their jobs independently and in line with high justice.

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